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The basic problem, it would seem, is not that we often behave badly
but that we may be losing our sense of ethics; the American consensus
about what is good and bad: what is to be done and whadt.avoided. may
be breaking down.,
Proponents of abortion-on-demand have won a major battle -- perhaps even
the war-in New York. While it lasted, the abortion controversy in that state
was a microcosm of the national debate. The outcome may be an omen for the
nation.
New York has enacted'what is essentially an abortion-on-demand law
although it is limited to the first twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.2 Within that
period any preinant woman, resident or non-resident, married or unmarfied, is
free to have an abortion provided only that ihe find a doctor willing to do'it. The
new law became effective on July 1, 1970. The prior law like'the statutes
presently in effect in a majority of states, forbade all' abortions except those
performed "under a reasonable belief that such [wasi necessary to preserve the
life of" the female.3
Revision of the law aborted anernbryonic constitutional challenge to New
York's prior abortion law. Proponents of abortion-on-demand had unleashed a
two-pronged attack: one in the legislature and one in the court. On November
4, 1969, a United States District Judge had signed an order granting the motion
of plaintiffs in four actions to convene a, three-judge court for purposes of de-
daring New York's abortion law unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its
enforcement , Depositions had been taken' and plaintiffs had served and filed
their briefs before the New York legislature passed the new bill. This. passage of
the new bill rendered the court action moot. Governor Rockefeller signed the bill
into law on April 11, 1970.'
Both in the three-judge court action: and in the public forum in connection
with the action of the legislature, it had been argued that the Catholic Church
was the only opponent of permissive abortion. In short, "the Catholic.in opposing
reform would impose his minority will upon the entire public ... ."I' The Church
* B.S., Fordham University, 1953; J.D., Fordham University, 1959; Professor of Law,
Fordham University School of Law; member of New York Bar.
1 Cogley, Introduction, in NATURAL LAW AND MODERN SOCIE-TY 11, 13 (1962).
2 Ch. 127, [1970] N.Y. Laws 170 (McKinney 1970) (effective July 1, 1970). Hawaii
preceded New York in enacting an abortion-on-demand law. The Hawaii law is analyzed in
Rice, The Anti-Life Movement, Twin Circle, May 10, 1970, at 11, col. 1.
3 Ch. 1030, §125.05 (3), [1965] N.Y. Laws 1583.
4 Hall v. Lefkowitz, 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Plaintiffs in the four cases
were a group of doctors and Planned Parenthood of New York, Inc., all of whom wished to
perform abortions or give abortion advice; a clergyman who gave abortion advice; a
heterogeneous group of doctors, social workers, feminists, etc.; and a number of persons at
the poverty level.
5 Hereinafter, citations to depositions refer to the depositions in -the four New York
actions.
6 N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1970, §1, at 47, col. 1.
7 Brief for Plaintiffs at 135-44, Hall v. Lefkowitz, Civil No. 69-4284 (S.D.N.Y.).
8 E.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1970, § 4 (The Week In Review), at 10, col. 2.
9 Hall, Commentary, in ABORTION AiN THE LAw 224, 231 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
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was isolated and qiite frequently an ad religionem attack was substituted for a
discussion on the merits. Typical of this line of attack is a story related by Jerome
M. Kummer, M.D., concerning a panel discussion on abortion at Loyola Uni-
versity, Los Angeles:
During the meeting at Loyola, the late Dr. A. C. Mietus commented
from the audience that he could not see how anyone could dispute the fact
that a two or three months' fetus was a human being. I replied that he
would not be there arguing his point were he not a Catholic. I say the
same about the article by the Mietus brothers, as well as articles along
similar lines by others. They would not be holding their strong views were
it not for their Catholic indoctrination.10
Because it has been effective, the ad religionem challenge cannot be shrugged
cff. Further, it raises substantial questions about the interrelationship of law,
morality and theology. With the change in the thrust of the abortion movement
from relaxation to abolition of abortion laws, the jurisprudential issues have been
brought into much sharper focus. This article will explore the jurisprudence of
abortion-on-demand. It seems important to determine at this juncture whose
morality is being enacted into law when abortion laws are effectively abolished.
In order to make this determination, a logical starting point is the distinction
between a question of fact and a question of morality.
I. The Human-ness of the Fetus:
A Question of Fact or Morality?
When one argues that the human fetus is entitled to fundamental human
rights, he is frequently confronted with the answer: "But I don't believe the
fetus is human," or "it is not human until it has (a) quickened, (b) become
viable or (c) been born," or "it is only potentially human." The human-ness of
the fetus is the crux of the abortion controversy. On the one hand, it is argued
by opponents of abortion-on-demand that the question of human-ness is one of
fact and the scientific facts are not in dispute. Proponents argue, to the contrary,
that resolution of the issue depends on personal or sectarian morality which the
law ought not to codify. The latter frequently frame their moral evaluations in
terms of the fertilized human egg which, of course, bears little superficial or
organic resemblance to the baby after birth." Opponents of abortion, including
the author, have taken up the challenge and defended the zygote as the beginning
of a new human life. 2
It is not the author's intention to abandon his position on the distinctive
10 Letter from J. M. Kummer to the Editor, 52 A.B.A.J. 524 (1966). The citation in
the quote to the "article by the Mietus brothers" refers to A. C. & Norbert J. Mietus,
Criminal Abortion: "A Failure of Law" or a Challenge to Society?, 51 A.B.A.J. 924 (1965).
11 See, e.g., Clark, Religion, Morality and Abortion: a Constitutional Appraisal, 2
LOYOLA (L.A.) L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1969); Hardin, Semantic Aspects of Abortion, 24 ETc.
263, 278-80 (1967); Ziff, Recent Abortion Law Reforms (Or Much Ado About Nothing),
60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 3, 20-21 (1969).
12 Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DUQUESNE L. Rav. 125, 127 (1966); Noonan, The
Constitutionality of the Regulation of Abortion, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 51 (1969).
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and independent human-ness of the fertilized human egg. 3 In reality, however,
the zygote should never have been the focus of the abortion debate. Proponents
of abortion-on-demand have used the zygote as a convenient strawman. Oppo-
nents have felt it necessary to pinpoint the moment human life begins
- that is, at conception. Unfortunately this most crucial issue has been
debated on a theoretical rather than a practical plane. A woman who wishes
to terminate an unwanted pregnancy does not seek an abortion at conception,
but at some later time in the gestation period. For practical purposes, the con-
troversy ought to shift chronologically from conception to that later point in
time. From the factual, scientific point of view, this- chronological shift alters
the controversy considerably. The question of when human life begins becomes
irrelevant. When an abortion is performed, human life-, as a matter of objective
science - has begun.
A. The Facts of Life at Eight Weeks
The interval between ovulation and menstruation is fourteen days.' As
a result, a woman will not begin to suspect that she is pregnant- until two weeks
after fertilization when she misses her menstrual period. She must wait at least
another week before she can have a pregnancy test which, at this stage, is liable
to produce a false result.'5 As a practical matter, then, the earliest'she will seek
to abort is the third to fourth week after fertilization.
By the fourteenth day of gestation, it is impossible for the zygote to split
into twins or to recombine with other fertilized ova to become a single zygote.'6
At the end of the second week, the name of the conceptus changes from zygote
to embryo,'" and between the third and fourth week, the embryo's heart begins
pumping.'3 Before a woman knows that she is pregnant and decides to abort,
the embryo has been organized irreversibly into a single human entity with a
pumping heart, has been implanted in the uterus, and has an eighty percent
chance of surviving through birth.' 9
Definitions of human death vary, but everyone seems to include as a
minimum the irreversible cessation of spontaneous heart and circulatory pulsation
13 That the fertilized egg is a new life, -independent of the pregnant female, has been
demonstrated dramatically by Dr. E. S. E. Hafez of Washington State University. Using
hormone injections, Dr. Hafez caused a cow's ovaries to release as many as 100 ripe eggs.
The cow was then artificially inseminated and several days after the mass conception, the
fertilized eggs were removed. They were transferred into smaller animals sfich as rabbits
where they continued to thrive up to 14 days before being put into other cows. "jT]he im-
planted calf will go through a normal gestation period and be born as if it were the foster
mother's own - but with the genetic qualities of its true parents." LIFE, Sept. 10, 1965, at 75.
In the sense that the fertilized egg can live and grow in a substitute environment, it can
be said to be "viable," i.e., capable of developing and surviving normally through birth outside
of the female which produced the egg and within which it was fertilized.
14 Hellegers, Fetal Development, 31, THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 3, 7 (1970).
15 Deposition of Dr. Andre Hellegers, M.D., at 50. Dr. Hellegers testified that the earliest
that a pregnancy test can be performed is two weeks after implantation of the embryo in
the wall of the uterus. Implantation occurs six to seven days after fertilization. Hellegers supra
note 14, at 6.
16 Hellegers, supra note 14, at 4, 8.
17 Id. at 8.
18 Id.
19 H. M. I. LILEY, MODERN MOTHERHOOD 7 (rev. ed. 1969).
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in the human subject.2 Conversely, the presence of such pulsation signals the
presence of life even in an immobile patient. By analogy to minimal definitions
of death; every decision to abort and every abortion performed pursuant to
that decision involves the killing of a living human-in-being, i.e., an individu-
ated, irreversible human entity with a pumping heart.
Actually, it is unreal to focus even on the third or fourth week of pregnancy.
Testifying in the New York abortion actions, plaintiff Alan Guttmacher, M.D.,
an obstetrician-gynecologist, a leading spokesman for permissive abortion and
the President of Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.,21 asserted
that most women who come to him seeking an abortion are in the eighth to tenth
week of pregnancy. 2 It can be assumed that some also come after ten weeks.2 "
Thus, the great majority of abortions will be performed after the eighth week.
The fetus at eight weeks has a pumping heart with fully deployed blood
vessels and has all other internal organs. 4 The face is completely formed, and
the arms, legs, hands, feet, toes and fingers are partially formed.25 The fetus
will react to tickling of the mouth or nose, and there is readable electrical activity
coming from the brain.2"
Photographs of the fetus around the eighth week present an unmistakable
human baby with rather blunt features and extremities.27 However, such pic-
tures invariably have been taken after the death of the fetus following an abor-
tion. Paul E. Rockwell, M.D., Director of Anesthesiology at Leonard Hospital
in Troy, New York, maintains that a fetus of eight weeks, while alive, appears
to be perfectly developed. It is death which superimposes the bluntness of
appearance:
Eleven years ago while giving an anesthetic for a ruptured ectopic
pregnancy (at two months gestation) I was handed what I believe was
the smallest living human being ever seen. The embryo sac was intact
and transparent. Within the sac was a tiny (approx. 1 cm.) human male
swimming extremely vigorously in the amniotic fluid, while attached to
the wall by the umbilical cord. This tiny human was perfectly developed,
with long, tapering fingers, feet and toes. It was almost transparent, as
regards the skin, and the delicate arteries and veins were prominent to
the ends of the fingers.
The baby was extremely alive and swam about the sac approximately
one time per second, with a natural swimmer's stroke. This tiny human
did not look at all like the photos and drawings and models of "embryos"
which I have seen, nor did it look like a few embryos I have been able
to observe since then, obviously because this one was alive!
20 See Halley & Harvey, Medical vs. Legal Definitions of Death, 204 J.A.M.A. 423 (1968).
Recent attempts to substitute brain death for heart death (including cases where the hearthas
been maintained artificially) have met with consternation. See HUMAN RiGHTS AND SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1028/ Add. 2 (1970) at 7-14.
21 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 13-14. "
22 Deposition of Alan F. Guttmacher, M.D., at 27.
23 In his Techniques of Therapeutic Abortion, 7 CLINICAL OBST. & GYN. 100 (1964),
Dr. Guttmacher describes the techniques for aborting fetuses up to the twenty-sixth week.
24 Hellegers, supra note 14, at 7-8.
25 LILEY, supra note 19, at 28.
26 Hellegers, supra note 14, at 7-8.
27 E.g., L. NILSsoN, A. INGELMAN-SUNDBERG & C. WtsfiN, A CHrLD Is BoRr 81 (1966).
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... When the sac was opened, the tiny human immediately -lost its
life ad'took on the appearance of what is accepted, as the appearance ofan embry  at this age (blunt extremities, etc.)
It is my opinion that if the lawmakers and people realized that very
vigorous life is present, it is possible that abortion would -be found: much
more objectionable than euthanasia.2
In summary: .at eight weeks, after which the great majority of- abortions
are performed, the fetus is irreversibly organized into a recognizable, human-
child, is responsive to stimulation, and is possessed of a pumping heart, a tunc-
tioning circulatory system, an active brain and all other internal organs. From
the practical scientific point of view, "'By the eighth week the embryo or
fetus, as we now call it, is an unmistakable human beinz. ,, (Citation
omitted.)
B. The Factual Irrelevance of Quickening
"Quickening" refers to that moment in the gestation period when the
pregnant woman feels the fetus move within her.8" Sir Edward Coke asserted:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth
it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her
body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision,
and no murder: but if the childe be born alive, and dieth of the potion,
battery, or other cause, this is murder.... 1
The majority of common law courts interpreted "qick with- -childe" to
mean quickening although a few chose the moment of conception as the be-
ginning of life. 2
.Quickening ordinarily is felt during the latter part of the fifth month of
pregnancy.3 The phenomenon varies with each woman and is thuis purely
subjective. One noted authority described the physical fact of quickening in
this way:
Some women feel their babieg much more strongly than others do, de-
pending on their own body fat and also upon the position of the placenta.
If the placenta lies in the front, of the mother's uterus, serving as a sort
of buffer'between the unborn and his mother's abdominal wall, she. may
feel her baby only slightly throughout her pregnancy. There have been
women who have never felt their babies at all. Others are not able to
differentiate between what feels like a "slight gas pain'! arid the thrust
of their baby's fist or elbow or foot.84
Actually the fetus moves long before the pregnant woman feels the move-
28 Albany Times Union, Mar. 10, 1970, at 17, col. 3.
29 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 n. I1 (D.D.C, 1946).
30 BLACi's LAw DicTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
31 3 COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAws OF ENoLAND 50 (1797).
32 R.. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 140 (2d ed. 1969).
33 N. EASTMAN, EXPECTANT MOTHERHOOD 9 (3d ed. 1957). It may occur as early as the
twelfth week. Hellegers, supra note 14, at 7-8.
34 LILEY, supra note 19, at 37-38.
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ment. 5 Dr. Andre Hellegers places the beginning of spontaneous fetal move-
ment at the tenth week of gestation." However, Dr. Paul Rockwell's experience
indicates that at eight weeks the fetus is capable of "swimming extremely
vigorously in the amniotic fluid.""7 Thus quickening is not a valid, factual,
objectively scientific test of the human-ness of the fetus because it "is a
phenomenon of maternal perception rather than a fetal achievement. It is sub-
jective and varies with the degree of experience and obesity of the mother."'
It might be suggested that spontaneous movement ought to be substituted
for quickening as the beginning of human life. Such an approach would, of
course, carry us back to the eighth to tenth week of pregnancy during and after
which the great majority of abortions are performed. In any event, spon-
taneous movement is hardly a satisfactory test since, as has been noted, an adult
patient is deemed to be alive as long as he has a spontaneously pulsating heart,
even though he is otherwise immobile - and the three to four weeks old embryo
has a spontaneously pumping heart.39
If quickening is factually irrelevant to the beginning of human life, then
the common law needs explaining. Why was abortion after quickening con-
sidered a homicide only if the child was born alive and then died? Why was
abortion prior to quickening no crime at all?
The early common law history of abortion is clouded by theologically
oriented disputatious on "ensoulment" overlaid by canon law."0 Ancient em-
bryological theories compounded the ambiguity.4 The law does not appear
to have been settled until Coke chose quickening as the crucial point in pregnancy
after which an abortion became criminal.42
It might be argued that Coke did not consider the unborn child to be a
human being until he was born alive, or else he would have designated all
abortions - including those which produced a stillbirth - as homicide. On
the other hand, .it is more likely that the difference in treatment of a live birth
followed by death (homicide) and a stillbirth (a great misprision) resulted
from difficulties in compiling evidence.
As a prerequisite to a homicide conviction, the common law required
proof that the act of the accused was the cause of death. However, given the
state of medical knowledge in the seventeenth century, such proof was not
always easy to come by. For instance, if the victim died after a year and a day
following an assault upon him, the assailant could not be convicted of homicide.
Proof of causality between the assault and the death was precluded by the
passage of time.44 Similarly, unless the child were born alive after an induced
35 Id. at 38.
36 Hellegers, supra note 14, at 8.
37 Albany Times Union, Mar. 10, 1970, at 17, col. 3.
38 Hellegers, supra note 14, at 8.
39 See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
40 See Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus,
1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 411-18 (1968).
41 See Quay, Justifiable Abortion - Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. L.J. 395,
426-30 (1961).
42 See text accompanying note 31 supra. Blackstone adopted Coke's rule. I W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES* 129.




abortion, it would have been virtually impossible to prove that the abortional act
killed him. He might have died in the womb from some other cause, concurrent
in time with the abortion.
The same difficulties in proof precluded the incrimination of pre-quickening
abortion. At least after quickening, it was possible to condemn every abortion as
an assault upon a human-in-being who was known (by his movements) to be
alive. If the fetus had not yet demonstrated life by movement, he might already
have been dead prior to the abortion - or perhaps the woman had not really
been pregnant. Hence, the abortional act could hardly be characterized as a
crime against a living human-in-being. The corpus delicti was unprovable.
Difficulties in proof seem to explain the common law of quickening. This
conclusion gains strength when one probes more deeply into other areas of the
common law. At least one English court took the position that-a woman, quick
with child, could not be executed for a crime even though the child had not
yet quickened. "'Quick with child' is having conceived. 'With quick child'
is when the child has quickened."4" The difference in the significance of quicken-
ing in the abortion and execution situations is explained by a shift in the benefit
of the doubt. The abortionist, as defendant, was entitled to the benefit of the
doubt as to (a) whether the fetus was alive or dead or even in existence when
the abortional act occurred and (b) whether the abortional act, in fact, killed
the fetus. But when a pregnant woman was about to be executed, the fetus,
as a possible innocent victim of the execution, was entitled to the benefit of the
doubt as to whether he was present and alive in the womb, even though he had
not yet manifested life by perceptible movement.
The execution situation was not unique. For purposes of inheritance, the
common law again recognized that "both by the rules of the common and civil
law, [the posthumous child] was, to all intents and purposes, a child [while
unborn], as much as if born in the father's life-time."'4 (Citations omitted.)
The independent existence of the unborn child was no mere legal fiction. In
Thellusson v. Woodford,4" the court in rebutting the claim that the unborn
child is a non-entity, stated:
Let us see, what this non-entity can do. He may be vouched in a re-
covery, though it is for the purpose of making him answer over in value.
He may be an executor. He may take under the Statute of Distributions.
He may take by devise. He may be entitled under a charge for raising
portions. He may have an injunction; and he may have a guardian.
W.. hy should not children en ventre sa mere be considered gen-
erally as in existence? They are entitled to all the privileges of other
persons. 48 (Citations omitted.)
In summary, the common law generally regarded the unborn child as a
human being except in the abortion situation where practical difficulties of proof
45 Regina v. Wycherley, 8 Car. & P. 262, 264, 173 Eng. Rep. 486, 487 (Nisi Prins 1838).
46 Wa~lis v. Hodson, 2 Atk. 114, 117, 26 Eng. Rep. 472, 473 (Oh. 1740); see Louisell,
Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 233,
235-38 (1969); Noonan, supra note 12, at 52-53.
47 4 Ves. Jun. 227, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Oh. 1798).
48 Id. at 322-23, 31 Eng. Rep. at 163-64.
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as to the presence of fetal life and the cause of fetal death mandated the quicken-
ing rules.
Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote:
It -is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.49
So it seems to be with the rules of quickening. Today medical science can
establish the presence of life in the womb long before the pregnant woman feels
fetal movement." Nor is the requirement of proof of causality any longer an
insuperable barrier. For example, one of the original objections to a recovery
for prenatal injuries was the difficulty in proving that the defendant's wrongful
act, in fact, produced the defect discovered at birth. But medicine has 'refined
its expertise and the objection is no longer valid."- Neither is the causality
objection any longer persuasive in the law of abortion.
It is not surprising that prior to the present movement for relaxed abortion
laws, quickening was gradually disappearing from state statutes on the subject.
Thus in 1960, the Supreme Court of Michigan commented on the pattern in
modem abortion legislation to abolish the quickening distinction altogether:
Courts in the field of criminal law have long recognized a child's
legal existence while en ventre sa mere, and a change has been noted
with respect to criminal abortion in that in late years statutes have been
amended doing away with the requirement that the woman must be
quick- with child.5 2 (Citations omitted.)
To paraphrase the Michigan -court, if quickening is factually irrelevant on
the question of when human life begins, it ought to be legally irrelevant to the
issue of abortion and the protection of a human life already begun.
C. The Factual Irrelevance of Viability
The unborn child is said to be viable when he is capable of existence apart
from his mother.5 With recent advances in technology, viability has been pushed
backfrom the twenty-eighth to the twentieth week of pregnancy." Scientists in
England, Sweden and the United States are already experimenting with an
artificial placenta which will enable the child to exist outside his mother's womb
at a much earlier stage.5  In one such experiment, Dr. G. Chamberlin was
able' to'keep an aborted human fetus alive for approximately 5 hours and 8
49 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAzv. L. Rav. 457, 469 (1897).
50 See- text accompanying notes 14-38 supra.
51 See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N Y. 349, 356, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695, 111 N.Y.S. 2d
-(195"1).
52 La Blue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 567, 100 N.W.2d 445, 450 (1960). The history
of the various state statutes is traced in Quay; supra note 41, at 447-520.
53 See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695, 111 N.Y.S. 2d -,
- (1951).
54 Hellegers, supra note 14, at 8-9.
55 Ayd, Experimentation on Pre-Natal Human Life: Ethical Considerations, Medical-
Moral Newsletter, June, 1969 at 37, 40.
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mihutes.* 'These giant steps in technology have led one doctor to conclude:
The youngest survivor in medical literature is of about 20 weeks'
gestation. Survivors with a birth weight between one and two pounds are
documented. Practically no knowledgeable person considers the age of
survivability as immutable; too many variables are involved. In this day
of DNA synthesis, test-tube incubation, intra-uterine transfusions, talk in
high circles of chromosomal manipulation and in vitro generation, the 20-
week survivability standard is about as sacred as the four-minute mile.57
Indeed, with the development of an artificial placenta, probably within the
next decade, even a twelve-week fetus may survive.5 The successful trans-
plantation of fertilized eggs in animals" suggests, that there may come a time
when every aborted fetus has a chance to live and grow to adulthood.
All of the abdve suggests the factual irrelevance of viability as an indicium
of: the beginning of human life. Viability is a function of technology, not a
qualitative characteristic of. the unborn child. In this respect, the nonviable
fetus might be compared to a space-walking astronaut who is connected by an
"umbilical cord" to the "mother ship." He too will die if the umbilical is severed
and he is cut off from his life-support system. (Do not we also speak 6f a space
mission being "aborted" when the life-support system fails to function?) If the
non-viability of the astronaut does not render nonhuman, then can we say less
of the non-viable fetus?
Like quickening, viability once enjoyed some standing in the law. In 1884,
in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,6 ' Holmes ruled that the estate of
a non-viable child, who was born prematurely and died a few minutes later fol-
lowing an injury to his mother negligently caused by defendant, had no cause
of action for either the pre-natal injuries to the child or his death. According
to Holmes, at least the non-viable child is an organic part of the pregnant
woman and not a separate human entity to whom legal duties are owed. A
dissenting judge in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital' argued that the Dietrich rule
ought to be limited to pre-natal injuries to non-viable children; if the child were
viable when iirjured in the womb, he could not be said to be a part of his mother.
Thus the door was opened for drawing a distinction in law between viable and
non-viable unborn children.
Dietrich remained the law as to all pre-natal injuries until the 1946 case
of Bonbrest v. Katz" wherein the court rejected the old Holmes rule and per-
mitted a recovery for a pre-natal injury to a viable child. The judge in Bonbrest
said "[t]he law is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and medical science
certainly has made progress since 1884,""8 and "[f]rom the viewpoint of the
56 Id. at 39.
57 Diamond, Humanizing the Abortion Debate, AmmucA, July 19, 1969,. at 36, 37.
58 Cavanagh, Reforming the Abortion Laws: A Doctor Looks at the Case, AMEriCA,
April 18, 1970, at 406, 410; see alio Noonan, Amendment of the Abortion Law: Relevant
Data and Judicial Opinion, 15 CATH. LAw. 124, 127 (1969).
59 See note 13 supra.
60 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
61 184 II. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 642 (1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
62 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
63 Id. at 143.
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civil law and the law of property, a child en ventre sa mere is not only regarded
as [a] human being, but as such from the moment of conception - which it
is in fact."64
In 1953, a New York Court extended the Bonbrest rule to pre-natal in-
juries to non-viable children 5 In rejecting viability as a line of demarcation
the court observed:
The mother's biological contribution from conception on is nourishment
and protection; but the foetus has become a separate organism and re-
mains so throughout its life. That it may not live if its protection and
nourishment are cut off earlier than the viable stage of its development
is not to destroy its separability; it is rather to describe conditions under
which life will not continue. Succeeding conditions exist, of course, that have
that result at every stage of its life, post-natal as well as pre-natal. The
complaint here, in alleging that plaintiff was in being in the third month
of his mother's pregnancy, alleges a conclusion of fact consistent with
generally accepted knowledge of the process.66
The trend in tort law after 1953 has been to disregard viability as a relevant
factor in a pre-natal injury case."
Tort law "is not an anachronism, but is a living law which responds to
the surging reality of changed conditions. ' 68 It is a "means 'for the creation
and protection of rights ... .' "69 Modern courts have recognized that the surging
reality of advances in the life sciences mandates the creation and protection of
rights for the non-viable fetus. The tort cases teach us that the "unborn child in
the path of an automobile is as much a person in the street as the mother .... "7"
Whether viable or non-viable, he is, as a matter of fact, no less a person in the
path of a curette wielded by an abortionist hired by his mother.
D. The Factual Irrelevance of Birth
"[B]irth is but a convenient landmark in a continuing process.. "7 It is
"just another step along the way.".7. "Birth is not a beginning .... [n]or is birth
an ending. It is more nearly a bridge between two stages of life .... 73
64 IdL at 140.
65 Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 696 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
66 Id. at 544, 125 N.Y.S. 2d at 697.
67 See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956);
Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Torigian v. Watertown News
Co., Inc., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d
108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401
Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Puhl v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99
N.W.2d 163 (1959).
68 Gallagher v. St. Raymond's Roman Cath. Ch., 21 N.Y.2d 554, 558, 236 N.E.2d 632,
634, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (1968).
69 Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 434, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966).
70 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 355 (3d ed. 1964). See E. PATTERSON, LAW IN A
SCIENTIFIC AGE, 35 (1963) where it was said: "IT]he meaning and scope of even such a
basic term as 'legal person' can be modified by reason of changes in scientific facts - the
unborn child has been recognized as a legal person, even in the law of torts."
71 B. PATTEN, FOUNDATIONS OF EMBRYOLOGY 3 (2d ed. 1964).
72 Deposition of biologist William Beckert, at 33.
73 A. MONTAGU, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH 205 (1964).
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Birth is a dramatic event but so too is puberty, and, as with puberty, birth,
factually, is merely a "landmark," "another step," a "bridge" in the life of a
human being whose life began sometime before. On the other hand, birth is
not a fixed event. The child is viable for a number of weeks before he is born. 4
During that period, he might have survived premature birth or surgical removal
from the womb. Birth, in other words, is no more factually relevant to the
humanness of the fetus than viability.
A number of jurisdictions still adhere to the rule that an action may not
be maintained for the wrongful death of a child stillborn as a result of pre-
natal injuries. These holdings are not intended as a denial of the humanity of
the unborn child; they merely reflect the difficulties inherent in any such action,
e.g., the practical impossibility of computing damages. 5
At issue in the abortion situation is the preservation of the unborn's life,
not the computation of damages consequent upon his death. Birth which may
have significance for the latter is irrelevant to the former. Further, the statutory
wrongful death action creates a right in the survivors; it is not intended to
vindicate a right of the child. Accordingly, the New York Court of Appeals has
held that the law will not consider the unborn child to be a legal person "'except
in so far as is necessary to protect the child's own rights'. 7 6 (Citation omitted.)
The most valuable of "the child's own rights," the one without which all other
rights are meaningless, is the right to live. Professor John T. Noonan observed:
The common law, before the enactment of wrongful death acts, was that
if a person were tortiously killed, no suit could be brought to vindicate
his death by civil damages because "the tort died with him." No one ever
asserted that the law did not recognize adult beings as persons because
at common law they had to survive in order to sue. No one ever said
that an injury was not done by destroying an adult because the law pre-
cluded recovery for the wrong.
It is plain that, in recognizing a cause of action for injury inflicted
before birth, a legal interest and personality are recognized as protected
before birth. The birth itself is not an. event which, suddenly and retro-
actively, endows the newborn with rights which a negligent motorist could
have invaded five months before the child had them. If the child in
the womb is a person in the path of the automobile, it is because he is a
person at the prenatal moment when the automobile or other agency of
injury or death strikes him.77 (Citations omitted.)
E. Fact, Value and Morality
In the view of Dr. Andre Hellegers,
it is not a function of science to prove, or disprove, where in this process
[of pre-natal maturation] human life begins, in the sense that those dis-
cussing the abortion issue so frequently use the word "life," i.e., human
dignity, human personhood, or-human inviolability. Such entities do not
74 Hellegers, supra note 14, at 8.
75 Byrn, supra note 12, at 128 n. 22.
76 Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 485, 248 N.E.2d 901, 904, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65,
70 (1969).
77 Noonan, supra note 58, at 128.
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pertain to the science or art of medicine, but are rather a societal judge-
ment.s
Science is able to demonstrate factually that abortion destroys an individu-
ated and unique human life. Society then makes a judgment on the worth of
the human life destroyed.
Those who refuse to admit the human-ness of the fetus - who say that
the fetus is merely "potential" or an organic part of the pregnant woman until
a particular stage of maturation - expound, not scientific fact, but a value
judgment on the worth of the unborn human life. They weigh the fetus' life
against other apparently competing values and they find that the latter out-
weigh the former.
Opponents of abortion also make a value judgment when they speak of
the "sanctity" of the life of the unborn child. As they view it, the value of the
single, innocent human life always preponderates except, perhaps, when weighed
against other human lives - as in the case of an abortion to pieserve the
mother's life.
The question boils down to this: how much weight is to be given to the
life of the fetus on the scale of human values in society? Each person's answer
will inevitably reflect a moral judgment on his part.
It is possible to assign priorities to societal goals without making a clear
moral judgment on the value of those goals; a moral judgment may not even
be involved. For instance, a community, desirous of improving the lot of its
inner-city citizens, may set as its goals the building of an industrial park to
provide more jobs and the construction of an additional school to provide a
better education. Which goal is more worthwhile? Which should have priority?
If a shortage of funds mandates that one goal be sacrificed, which one should
go? A difference of opinion on these questions does not necessarily involve a
difference in fundamental morality.
The abortion decision, however, always presents a moral option. The choice
between the school and the industrial park, no matter which way it goes, is
premised on the moral judgment that the ghetto dweller is possessed of essential
human dignity. It is merely a question of how that dignity is best served. The
abortion decision, since it involves the destruction of human life, for no other
reason, perhaps, than it is unwanted, is as Dr. Hellegers points out, a judgment
that a particular human life lacks the complete dignity of human-ness. In the
case of abortion-on-demand, the unborn human life is reduced almost to the
level of an animal. 9 If the unborn human life is unwanted, it is moral to de-
stroy it. Pro-abortionist Lawrence Lader wrote, "[t]he real sin, reformers de-
clare, is the law that demands an unwanted child .... [T]he morality of humane
abortion demands that we bring our law up to date with medical progress.""
78 Hellegers, supra note 14, at 9.
79 Sometimes the unborn child is reduced to an even lower level. For instance, one
issue of a popular magazine carried separate articles deploring the slaughter of baby seals and
advocating the destruction of defective fetuses. Compare Leonard, Why Must They Die?,
LooK, November 4, 1969 at 42 with Rorvik; The Unborn, Loox, November 4, 1969 at 74.
80 Lader, The Scandal of Abortion - Laws, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1965, § 6 (Magazine)
at 32, col. 1, 62, col. 3.
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Quite clearly, in Lader's view, the principle is a m 6 ral one: To prohibit an
abortion of an unwanted child is immoral, to allow it is moral. Anti-abortionists
agree that the issue is grounded in morality but -would frame the principle
differently.
Before probing more deeply into the morality of abortion and its relation-
ship to law, one other question has to be answered. It it possible to be morally
opposed to abortion without espousing a particular sectarian moral theology?
In the New York abortion actions, plaintiffs claimed that anti-abortion laws
violate the first amendment guarantee against laws respecting ;in establishment
of religion in that they have been retained principally because they embody the
theology of the Roman Catholic Church."1 The inference is that moral objections
to abortion of necessity flow from Catholic theology."
Moral principles may and do exist apart from sectarian theology or any
theology at all. Some religions which expound ethical values do not, as the
Supreme Court has noted; teach what generally would be considered a belief
in the existence of God, e.g., "Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular
Humanism and others." 2 In the conscientious objector" cases, 8 the Court
scrutinized the personal objection to war of one of the objectors who "decried
the tremendous 'spiritual' price man must pay for his willingness to destroy
human life'.""s In upholding the claim of the objector, the Court concluded
that "the test of belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' is whether a given
belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its pos-
'sessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.... ,85 In short, a
person may construct for himself a system of morality in regard--to the value
of human life even though he does not accept the creed of any theocentic
religious sect. To support this thesis, the Court quoted from Dr. David'Saville
Muzzey, a leader in the Ethical Culture Movement:
Instead of positing a personal God, whose existence man can neither
prove nor disprove, the'ethical concept is founded on human experience.
It is anthropocentric, not theocentric. Religion, for all the various defini-
tiong that have been given of it, must surely mean the devotion of ma~n
to the highest ideal that he can conceive. And that ideal is a community
of spirits in which the latent moral potentialities of men shall have been
elicited by their reciprocal endeavors to cultivate'the best in their fellow
men. What ultimate reality is we do not know; but we have the faith
that it expresses itself in the human World as the power which inspires in
men moral purpose.
Thus the "God" that we love is not the figure on the great white
throne, but the perfect pattern, envisioned by faith, of humanity as it
should be, purged of the evil elements Which retard its progress toward
"the knowledge, love and practice of the right."8 6 (Citations omitted.)
81 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 135-44. However,-a statute is not unconstitutional
because coincidentally it embraces the theology of a particular sect. McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday Closing Laws).
82 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U... 488, 495 n.11 (1961),
83 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
84 Id. at 187.
85 Id. at 165-66.
86 Id. at 183; see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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If an anthropocentric ethical code can lead one to deplore "the tremendous
'spiritual' price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life" in war,
then secular morality may also impel us to lament the tremendous spiritual price
society must pay for its willingness to destroy human life in utero. We may
even be moved to go further and urge that society be "purged of the evil ele-
ments" of abortion "which retard its progress toward 'the knowledge, love and
practice of the right.' "
A person may, if he likes, choose to condemn abortion by invoking the
tenets of Catholic theology, but anti-abortionists typically have not. They have
spoken in terms of secular morality and its relationship to law. 7 They urge that
the sanctity and fundamental equality of human life is a valid principle of
secular morality, that it is invidiously discriminatory and immoral to concede
the presence of human dignity in some humans-in-being (e.g., healthy adults)
and not in others (e.g., defective fetuses), that the law historically has pro-
tected human life from the moment that its existence in the womb could factually
be established, and that to deny the human-ness (human dignity and human
rights) of unborn children will undermine those first principles of morality which
are the foundation of our society: the sanctity of life, fundamental human
equality, freedom and decency.
II. Abortion-on-Demand: The Moral-Legal Conflicts
Few would openly dispute the proposition that the sanctity of life, funda-
mental human equality, decency and freedom are values which are essential
to a democratic society. But freedom is a difficult concept to define. If it means
sheer libertarianism - a sort of egomoralism translated into action - then
these other values cannot coexist with it. One man's unrestrained freedom is
another man's enslavement.
The American ideal of freedom is not sheer libertarianism but rather ordered
liberty which, in turn, implies that norms have been used to put various values
in a desired order of priority. These value judgments, as previously shown, are
really moral judgments.8 8 As the late John Courtney Murray wrote:
Part of the inner architecture of the American ideal of freedom has
been the profound conviction that only a virtuous people can be free.
It is not an American belief that free government is inevitable, only that
it is possible, and that its possibility can be realized only when the people as
a whole are inwardly governed by the recognized imperatives of the
universal moral law.
• . . Political freedom is endangered in its foundations as soon as
the universal moral values, upon whose shared possession the self-discipline
of a free society depends, are no longer vigorous enough to restrain the
passions and shatter the selfish inertia of men. The American ideal of
freedom as ordered freedom, and therefore an ethical ideal, has tradi-
tionally reckoned with these truths, these truisms.8 9
87 For an extended anti-abortion statement on a secular level, see, e.g., GOVRNOR'S
CoMMIssIoN APPOINTED TO REVIEW NEW YORK STATE'S ABORTION LAW, MINORITY RE-
PORT (1968) [hereinafter cited as MINORITY REPORT].
88 See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
89 J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 36-37 (1960).
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The sanctity of life, fundamental human equality, decency and freedom
are not, therefore, empty semantic niceties. Traditionally, we have regarded
them both in law and in daily life as imperatives of the universal moral law.
The Declaration of Independence holds as self-evident the moral truths "that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi-
ness." The fourteenth amendment institutionalized these principles, particularly
the principle of equality, in the Constitution."' "The great fundamental guarantees
of the Constitution are, after all, moral standards wrapped in legal com-
mands .... "
Pro-abortionists also maintain a scale of values which they would translate
into a "'utopian world'" - "'an enlightened society' wherein it would be
possible for any woman to be legally aborted of any unwanted pregnancy."92
It is important that this value system of the pro-abortionists be examined in re-
lation to the moral principles which underlie our law.
A. Individualism versus the Sanctity of Life
Yves Simon defined "individualism" as "the philosophy according to which
the common good is merely a useful one, in other words, is a mere means to
the good of individuals. . . . "" In the abortion debate, individualism emerges
in the claim that our anti-abortion laws wrongfully invade the privacy of the
individual, of the family, and of the physician-patient relationship. Privacy,
as a useful individual good, is exalted over the sanctity of life, a common social
good. One court, in upholding the primacy of privacy, stated the proposition
this way:
For the purposes of this decision, we think it is sufficient to conclude
that the mother's interests [i.e., the right of privacy] are superior to that
of an unquickened embryo, whether the embryo is mere protoplasm, as
the plaintiff contends, or a human being, as the Wisconsin statute declares.94
Is the court correct? Does our law exalt privacy over life?
1. Personal Privacy. Personal privacy is a treasured right but it has never
been regarded as absolute. The private life of a recluse, who has long been
out of the public eye, may be exposed with impunity.95 A stop and frisk may be
reasonable though it constitutes "a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished
personal security .... "6 A person may be required to submit to a vaccina-
tion,97 and a blood sample may forcibly be extracted from the body of an in-
90 See II B. SCHWARTZ, RIGHTS OF THE PERSONS § 468 (1968).
91 P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 35 (1968).
92 N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1965, at 37, col. 4. (Quoting Dr. Carl Goldmark, Jr., in his
inaugural address as president of the New York County Medical Society.)
93 Y. SIMON, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW 97 (1965).
94- Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis. 1970);. accord, People v.
Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 996, 1005, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 915 (1970); contra, Commonwealth v. Brunelle, No. 83879 (Middlesex County,
Mass. Super. Ct. 1970).
95 Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
96 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968).
97 Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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dividual arrested for drunken driving.9" Conversely, the state, as parens patriae,
may require a woman to submit to a blood transfusion necessary to preserve
her life in order that her small child shall not be left without a mother.9"
A conflict between the mother's privacy and the fetus's life developed in
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson 0' wherein the
New Jersey Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the rights of a child
in utero were violated by his mother's refusal, on religious grounds, to submit to
a blood transfusion necessary to preserve the lives of both the mother and the
unborn child. Finding a parity of rights between the pre-natal and the post-
natal child, the court held:
We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law's protection
and that an appropriate order should be made to insure blood transfusions
to the mother in the event that they are necessary in the opinion of the
physician in charge at the time.'"
In each of the above cases, the right of privacy was subordinated to a
more compelling state interest. In the last case, the interest of the state was
in protecting human life. Or as another court put it, in upholding the con-
stitutionality of an anti-abortion statute, "Protection of life has traditionally been
one of the first duties owed by a state to its people."''1 2
In the abortion context, the right of privacy is really a euphemism for
a mother's desire, whatever her reason may be, to rid herself of an unwanted
and burdensome life. To acquiesce in her claim of right is to erode the
concept of the sanctity of life by devaluing the life of a weak and dependent
human individual in order to accommodate the competing claims to comfort
and convenience of a stronger member of society.
The erosion is not limited to the rights of the pre-natal human-in-being.
Such events as quickening, viability and birth are, as previously shown, factually
irrelevant to the question of whether a human fetus is a human child.'03 In
the light of these irrelevancies, a woman might claim, as a corollary of the
right to abort and an incident of the right of privacy, the right to destroy a
defective newborn who may also prove burdensome to her. Thus, the plaintiffs
in the New York abortion action, arguing on behalf of the woman's right of
privacy, stated:
When pregnancy begins, she is faced with a state mandate compelling.
her to serve as an incubator for months, and finally as an ostensibly willing
mother for up to twenty or more years. Often she must forego a career
or further education, and she and her immediate family must endure
social and economic hardships.0 4 (Emphasis added.)
98 Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
99 Application of President and Directors of Georgetown, Col., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
100 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
101 Id. at 423, 201 A. 2d at 538.
102 Commonwealth v. Brunelle, No. 83879, at 5 (Middlesex County, Mass. Super. Ct. 1970).
103 See text accompanying notes 30-77 supra.
104 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 87. When he signed the New York abortion bill,
Governor Rockefeller commented, "Women's liberation played an important part in the pas-
sage of this bill." N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1970, § 1, at 47, col. 1. Mrs. Betty Friedan, the
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Apparently the woman's right of privacy is invaded not only by being man-
dated to serve as an incubator for the pre-natal child, but also by being forced
to serve as a mother for the child after birth. If she can relieve herself of one
burden, why not the other?
Testifying in the New York abortion action, plaintiff Alan F. Guttmacher,
M.D., identified Glanville Williams' book, The Sanctity of Life and the Crimi-
nal Law,' as "one of my bibles."'0 8  Williams wrote, "an eugenic killing by
a mother, exactly paralleled by the bitch that kills her mis-shapen puppies,
cannot confidently be pronounced immoral. And where this certainty is lacking,
should not liberty prevail?"'0 2 " This is not to say that every pro-abortionist, in-
cluding Dr. Guttmacher, espouses infanticide; it is to say that the morality of
abortion-on-demand, if one accepts it, removes the moral taint from infanticide.
Ashley Montagu has maintained-
[T]he embryo, fetus and newborn of the human species, in point of
fact, do not really become functionally human until humanized in the
human socialization process.
Humanity is an achievement not an endowment. The potentialities
constitute the endowment, their fulfillment requires a humanizing en-
vironment. 10
Montagu does not deny the human-ness of either the fetus or the newborn.
He places a lesser value, however, on the lives of each. Contrary to the Decla-
ration of Independence, human rights, which are the reflection of human
value, are not endowed at creation; they are achieved only when one is able
to function independently as a person in society. Neither the newborn nor
the unborn qualify.
Dr. H. M. I. Liley has said that the fetus "is... a tiny human being,
as independent as though he were lying in a crib with a blanket wrapped
around him instead of his mother."'0 9 If we accept the morality of abortion-
on-demand-cum-personal-pivacy, then we must be prepared to accept the
radical alteration of the sanctity of life which will permit us to kill the child,
not only in the womb, but also in the crib.
2. Family Privacy. Like personal privacy, family privacy is highly valued
in our law. But like personal privacy, it is not absolute. A family victimized
by criminals may seek seclusion to forget its ordeal only to find. the incident
resurrected by the media several years later."0 The family may not be polyg-
amous."' Despite his parents' objection, a court may order formal schooling
for a child"' or prohibit the child's labor. The parents may not "expose
founder of the National Organization of Women, advocates child day care centers to "get
rid of the mawkish Mother's Day approach to child care and drastically change society....
N.Y. Post, May 29, 1970, at 2, col. 1, 54, col. 2.
105 G. WILLIAMS, THn SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw (1957).
106 Deposition of Alan G. Guttmacher, M.D., at 64.
107 WILLIAMS, supra note 105, at 20.
108 Letter from Ashley Montagu to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1967, at 38, col. 6.
109 LrLmY, supra note 19, at 26-27.
110 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
III Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).




the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health
or death."" " (Citation omitted.)
In Gleitman v. Cosgrove,"' the unborn child's right to live came into
conflict with family privacy. Plaintiff-family sought damages from two doctors
who had attended Mrs. Gleitman during her pregnancy. The Gleitmans al-
leged that their child had been born with grave defects after the doctors had
negligently failed to warn them that an attack of German measles suffered by
the mother during the pregnancy might result in birth defects. The failure to
give the warning, it was alleged, deprived the family of the opportunity of
terminating the pregnancy. In affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the
majority of the court emphasized the primacy of the child's right to live:
The right to life is inalienable in our society....
We are not faced here with the necessity of balancing the mother's life
against that of her child. The sanctity of the single human life is the
decisive factor in this suit in tort. Eugenic considerations are not con-
trolling. We are not talking here about the breeding of prize cattle. It
may have been easier for the mother and less expensive for the father to
have terminated the life of their child while he was an embryo, but these
alleged detriments cannot stand against the preciousness of a single human
life to support a remedy in tort.11
Gleitman highlights the inappositeness of Griswold v. Connecticut"" in the
abortion debate. That the conjugal use of contraceptives is within the penumbras
of privacy as held by the Supreme Court in Griswold, does not mean that
abortion is similarly situated:
The contraceptive relationship is between a man and a woman ...
The abortion relationship, on the other hand, is between parents and
child. This additional party changes the whole structure of the situation.
The freedom of the parents is limited by the rights of the child."3
Like personal privacy, family privacy is a euphemism for the family's
desire to rid itself of an unwanted and a burdensome member. And like personal
privacy, the erosive effect on the sanctity of life is the same. If the Gleitman
family had been permitted to destroy its defective child in the womb, then upon
what rational basis would one deny to X family the right to destroy its de-
fective child in the delivery room of a hospital?
3. Physician-Patient Privacy. The privacy of the physician-patient rela-
tionship is not open to doubt. Proponents of abortion-on-demand assert that anti-
abortion laws unlawfully intrude into this relationship. They assume necessarily
that the doctor treating a pregnancy owes an obligation of good medical care
to only one patient, the pregnant woman. The judgment is, of course, a moral,
114 Id. at 166-67.
115 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
116 Id. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693.
117 381 U.S. 479 (1965).




not a medical one. It means that the socio-economic "health" of the woman
is valued more highly than the life of the child."
In fact, however, the doctor has two patients when he treats a pregnancy
mother and child. In Jones v. Jones,10 a New York court found that the
unborn child
became a patient of the mother's obstetrician, as well as the mother her-
self. In so holding, I can think of the infant as a third-party beneficiary
of the mother-doctor contract or perhaps a principal for whom the
mother acted as agent.' 2'
As patient of the obstetrician, the child may recover damages for a pre-
natal injury suffered as the result of the negligence of his doctor." Anti-
abortion laws do not intrude upon the physician-patient relationship; quite the
contrary, the laws come into play only when the doctor, qua socio-moral engi-
neer, betrays his obligation to his unborn patient.
The idea that a doctor should be free of legal restraints in making socio-
moral judgments is dangerous indeed. Human experimentation, research in
dangerous drugs, the use of experimental drugs which may be harmful to the
unborn child, and vital organ transplants, for instance, raise serious problems
of protecting human rights which the law may not ignore. Depredations by
the medical profession in Nazi Germany " suggest that the sanctity of life
suffers dramatically when the law abrogates its responsibility of protecting the
patient against betrayal by his doctor. Out of his experiences as an inmate in
a Nazi concentration camp, Dr. Viktor E. Frankl wrote:
it is not the doctor's province to sit in judgment on the value or lack
of value of a human life. The task assigned to him by society is solely
that of helping wherever he can, and alleviating pain where he must;
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profession competent in education, the laws governing their work, such as on
prayers at public schools, should be administered or defined at their discretion. Such
claims are patently absurd, for they would demand jurisdiction on matters completely
beyond their professional competence.
The state, in the exercise of its police power, may regulate the medical profession to protect
the health and welfare of all its citizens. See Wasmuth v. Allen, 14 N.Y.2d 391, 399, 200
N.E.2d 756, 760, 252 N.Y.S.2d 65, 71, appeal dismissed, 379 U.S. 11 (1964); Barsky v.
Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954).
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Glanville Williams noted that legalized infanticide "would involve the co-
operation of the medical profession .... "125 If physician-patient privacy pro-
tects the physician's accessoryship to abortion, then would it not accord a
similar protection to infanticide?
The law has traditionally adhered to the first moral principle that every
innocent human life, as soon as it is detected and wherever it may be found,
is sacred and inalienable. The philosophy of individualism, which would
justify an abortion for personal convenience under the guise of privacy, is
radically antithetical to that jurisprudence of life.
B. Quality versus Equality
A "quality of life" theme ran through the testimony of plaintiff-physicians
in the New York abortion actions. Dr. Alan F. Guttmacher testified that
there is little disagreement among doctors on the strict medical indications for
abortion. The parting of the ways occurs when "quality of life" factors enter
into the abortion decision:
So I would say that men make these decisions in good conscience, in
good will, trying to improve the lot of mankind and in trying to improve
the lot of mankind, we come to our conclusions, which may differ, de-
pending upon their own background and our own philosophy and thinking.
Q. And on your own view, perhaps, of medical standards?
A. No, religious attitudes, ethical attitudes. Medical, standards, I
don't think that would enter into it very much.
Most of these decisions are really made on things outside of medicine.
What kind of a human being you are, how conservative, how liberal,
your religious background.
You see, medicine, fortunately, has outgrown just sheer survival,
just the beating of heart and the breathing of a lung.
This is not life. Life is a much more total experience than that and
that's where the vagueness of the law comes in and that's where doctors
have such difficulty. 12 6
Dr. Guttmacher further interpreted "the quality of life" as "the amount of
happiness and the ability of the individual to be useful to himself and his
family, the pleasures and all that."' 7
Plaintiff Louis M. Hellman, M.D., equated "life" with "worth living":
I believe that life is a little more than breathing in and out and having
a heartbeat.
There is something about the quality of life that makes it worth living.
Otherwise, you're just some kind of an animal .... US
According to Dr. Hellman, in measuring the desired quality of life, "In this
country, you have to consider the dollars ....
125 WILLIAMS, supra note 105, at 20.
126 Deposition of Alan F. Guttmacher, M.D., at 55-56.
127 Id. at 23.
128 Deposition of Louis M. Hellman, M.D., at 54.
129 Id. at 108. The question of whether abortion laws are unconstitutionally vague is
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Yves Simon deplored the "myth of a- conimon good external to man,"
a "counterfeit common good" which conceives "a human community after the
pattern of a work of art."'3 0 The quality of life concept partakes of this myth
except that technology is substituted for art. 'The quality life, like the well-
oiled machine, runs smoothly and functions usefully. If the machine is defective,
it is less valuable. 'Vita is not truly vita unless it is la dolce vita.
In this technological scheme of life, abortion becomes a, useful tool for
keeping the machines in quality condition. It serves to eliminate the least
functional members of society (unborn children) who might, by their presence,
disrupt the smooth running of things. The abortional act is considered morally
good since it represents advanced technological know-how. Beduse doctors
now know how to perform abortions safely, abortion, in the view of 'its pro-
ponents, must be a civil right,""3 a morally acceptable way of curing the social
ills which detract from the quality of life. With abortion freely available, it
is urged, there will no longer be any unwanted children; 3 2 population control
by abortion will de-pollute our natural resources 33 anrd eradicate poverty;"3 4
and the illegal abortionist will be driven-out of business."3 5
beyond the scope of this paper. Compare People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 996, 458 P.2d 194,
80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970), and United States v. Vuitch,
305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969) with State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 244 A.2d 499, cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968),_ and Kudish v. Bd. of Registration, - Mass. "-----, 248
N.E.2d 264 (Mass. 1969). The author suggests, however, that the exception in the abortion
statutes, "necessarylto preserve the life [or health] of" the pregnant woman, becomes vague
only when the attending physician (a) refuses to ackiowledge the unborn child as a patient
to whom he owes an obligation of good medical care, and (b) substitutes his subjective
concept of quality of life for the known norm's of survival of life. The tistimony of Drs.
Guttmacher and Hellman would seem to bear out this hypothesis.
130 Sibior, supra note 93, at 92.
131 See, e.g., Means, supra note 40; Lader, supra note 80.
132 But see LrLEy, supra note 19, at 198:
In cases trying abortionists, the baby is never mentioned. Apparently only the
mother's life and welfare is at stake. Yet all of us, if we count for something now,
also counted for something before we were born. Until individual fetal life is
regarded as valuable, will people stop to think twice about shouldering the great
responsibility of bringing new life, wanted or unwanted, into the world?
133 But see Greeley, Between Pollution, Population, The Tablet, May 21, 1970, at 14, col. 1:
As demographer Ben Watterberg puts it, "Lake Erie, the Hudson River, the
Potomac are ecological slums today. If the U.S. Population did not grow by one
person over the current 205,000,000 Americans these bodies of water would still
be ecological slums . . .
and I know enough social science to be able to say that the linking of abortion
and pollution is either stupid or dishonest and quite possibly both.
* 134 But see Neuhaus, The Dangerous Assumptions, COmmONWEAL, June 30, 1967, at 408,
411:
We are told about the poor underprivileged child who could have been spared
the trials of life had he been aborted in the womb. . . .As an inner-city pastor
in Brooklyn, it occurred to me that by these criteria almost all the children in
my parish should not have been born. . . . [Pleople who are reactionary on other
issues suddenly become very liberal with regard to birth control in the ghetto.
135 But more humans-in-being will die. In every country where abortion laws have been
relaxed, the total number of abortions has risen dramatically (and every abortion kills at
least one human-in-being). Over a 15-year period, Sweden and Denmark, operating under
modified abortion laws, experienced a tenfold increase in hospital abortions with no decrease
in illegal abortion. See Tietze, Abortion in Europe, 57 Am. J. oF PuBLic HEALTH 1923,
1927-28 (1967). In Rumania, where abortion was available on demand, the birth rate dropped
so dramatically that a more restrictive law was enacted. Id. at 1931. In Hungary, abortions
exceed live births; other Eastern European countries also have disproportionately high abortion
to live birth ratios. Tietze, The Demographic Significance of Legal Abortion in Eastern Europe, 1
DEMOGRAPHY 119, 120 -(1964). As a result of its abortion-on-demand law, Japan is in
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Analyzing this technological approach to life, the late Thomas Merton
concluded:
Philosophy reduces itself to knowing how: knowhow. The question
"what?" is relatively insignificant. As long as one knows how, the what
will take care of itself. You just initiate the process, and keep it going.
That what follows. In fact the how tends more and more to determine
the what. s' 6
Obviously, the final arbiter of morality in this society of techno-moralism
must be the technician. The practice of medicine changes, as Drs. Guttmacher
and Hellman observed, from the treatment and preservation of a beating heart
and a respiring lung (the "what") to the engineering of a quality life (the
"how"); and the law must not interfere in physician-patient "privacy" when
these judgments on quality are made.
Improving the quality of life is surely a laudable purpose. All children
should be wanted. Pollution, poverty and illegal abortions are genuine social
ills. But the quality of life movement becomes invidious and dangerous when it
equates the quality of life with life itself, especially with factors like "usefulness,"
and "dollars" thrown in. It is simply incompatible with the first moral principle
of fundamental human equality as that ideal has heretofore been understood.
First, the principle of equality does not excuse discrimination because it
subserves a public object." 7 Vulnerable members of society are not sacrificed
to achieve a more smoothly functioning community. For instance, cutting down
the incidence of crime is a worthwhile goal but it may not be accomplished by
discriminatorily mandating the sterilization of a particular class of felons.ls"
Interracial strife is to be avoided, but not by the discriminatory segregation
of the races.' In short, the know-how of creating a functionally efficient
society cannot be utilized if it conflicts with the principle of fundamental human
equality. In the context of abortion, this means that the unborn child is entitled
to the equal protection of the law. 4
danger of becoming a "nation of old people." N.Y. Post, May 11, 1970, at 5, col. 1. Over
the two-year life of its modified abortion law, California experienced a 133% increase in
hospital abortions. "The ratio [of abortions to live births] appears to be increasing rapidly."
CALIFORNIA BUREAU OF MATERNAL AND CHILD CARE, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CALIFORNIA THERAPEUTIC ABORTION ACT 2 (Jan. 1970) [herein-
after cited as THIRD ANNUAL REPORT]. Yet in the midst of this increase, it was claimed that
illegal abortions had not decreased. See Monroe, How California's Abortion Law Isn't Work-
ing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 10, col. 1. Britain's hospital abortion
rate has risen geometrically. See SHAW, ABORTION ON DEMAND 7 (1969).
On the other hand, statistics on illegal abortion and abortion deaths in the United States
have been grossly exaggerated. Byrn, Demythologizing Abortion Reform, 14 CATH. LAw. 180,
183-85 (1968).
136 Merton, The Other Side of Despair, THE CRITIC, Oct.-Nov., 1965 at 13, 15.
137 Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 560 (1902).
138 Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
139 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
140 The equal protection argument is explored in MINoRITY REPORT, supra note 87, at
67-68. As pointed out therein, no violence is done to the fourteenth amendment principle of
equality by punishing abortion less severely than murder. The law recognizes "degrees of
evil" and states may treat offenders accordingly. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540
(1942). Killing an unborn child may very well involve less personal malice than killing his
afterborn counterpart. An abortion to preserve the life of the pregnant woman is not
violative of human equality. The choice in such a situation is between saving one life (the
mother) or losing two (the mother and the child). The purpose of the abortion is to save life,
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The novelty of the proposition, if it be so, need not disturb us. From its
original intent to safeguard Negroes against discrimination by Whites, the four-
teenth amendment has evolved into a broad guarantee of equality both to
artificial persons and to all natural persons irrespective of citizenship, sex or
race. 41 In an era of increased sensitivity to human rights, it would be the
ultimate in irony if the corporation which manufactures the instruments used
to abort the unborn human child was entitled, as an artificial person, to equal
protection of the law, while the unborn child, who is in all respects qualitatively
human, is deprived of that protection.
Second, in order for the Equal Protection Clause to remain viable, it must
include every natural human being within the state. Natural human beings
cannot be denied equality by, the simple expedient of categorizing them as non-
persons. If that were so, all sorts of "non-quality," non-functioning groups of
human beings might, by simple redefinition, become sub-human and fair game
for legally-sanctioned discrimination. Sociologist Andrew Greeley indicated:
Indeed, those who think that overpopulation is what is destroying our
environment (instead of the venality of business and corruption in American
government) might want to ponder other methods of population control
such as the antiseptic disposal of unwanted infants or the elimination of
people over 60.
There have been other societies which have seen nothing wrong with
killing the very young and the very old and surely the argument in favor
of "liberal" abortion bills which permit a human being to be killed when
it is 25 weeks old could be stretched easily enough to include, say a baby,
25 weeks after it has been born or a retired person, say, 25 weeks after
he is retired. 42
It is noteworthy that Glanville Williams, in addition to expounding the
morality of infanticide, also favors legalized euthanasia' 48 A euthanasia bill
followed the abortion bill in Parliament and though it was defeated, the
Euthanasia Society in England continues to press for "reform" of the law. 44
Lord Dawson of Penn, speaking in favor of an earlier bill, invoked the dis-
criminatory quality-of-life-cum-functional-utility theme:
the very value which the law of homicide seeks to preserve. The gist of abortion-on-demand
is, however, the discriminatory destruction of a burdensome and unwanted life. The principle
of legal necessity which permits an abortion to save life also applies to post-natal human
beings, e.g., the mountaineer, roped to a companion dangling below, who cuts the rope to
save his own life rather than perish with his companion whose death is inevitable anyway.
MINoRY REPORT, supra note 87, at 72. Some (including the author) may entertain doubts
about the morality even of an abortion to preserve life; however we must admit that legaliza-
tion of such abortions does not attack the sanctity of life and fundamental human equality
as essential underpinnings of our law.
141 See, SCHWARTZ, supra note 90 at §469.
142 Greeley, supra note 133.
143 WLLIAMs, supra note 105, at 311.
144 The history to date of the activities of Euthanasia Societies in England and the United
States is traced in Ayd, Voluntary Euthanasia: The Right to be Killed, Medical-Moral News-
letter, .Tan. and Feb., 1970, at 17. One editorialist comments that despite the defeat of
the euthanasia bill,
the realist may suspect that the slippery slope is already visible both in England
and here in America. . . . Anglo-American jurisprudence has, in its abortion re-
forms, already begun to tolerate the destruction of one human being.., to promote
the convenience and comfort of another person. America, May 2, 1970, at 463.
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This is a courageous age, but it has a different sense of values from the
ages which have gone before. It looks upon life more from the point of
view of quality than of quantity. It places less value in life when its
usefulness has come to an end. 45
The techno-morality which justifies abortion-on-demand of necessity embraces
infanticide and euthanasia.
Pastor Richard John Neuhaus warned of the irreparable harm to the ideal
of equality which results from espousal of the quality of life jurisprudence:
In other lands and in other times, the, termination of the' life process
for reasons of general welfare or convenience has been countenanced
(such reasons have included racial and ideological considerations), but
these are not very encouraging examples. The "fragility of the membranes
of civilization" (J. F. Kennedy) cautions against moving in this direction.1 4
The idea that all men are created equal cannot coexist with the counterfeit
common good which sees equality as something external to man, to be manip-
ulated by society in order to achieve the quality life.
C. Coercion versus Freedom
Can a society which embraces the techno-morality of quality of life
permit its citizens to reproduce at will? Probably not. Thomas Merton warned:
the claim of science and technology to expand the capacity of the human
person for life and happiness is basically fraudulent, because technological
society ... is concerned purely and simply with the functioning of its own
processes. Human beings are used merely as a means to this end . .147
Thus, the right to reproduce could well be subordinated to current standards
of quality control. Ashley Montagu wrote:
I consider it a crime against humanity to bring a child into the world
whose fulfillment as a healthy human being is in any way menaced or
who itself menaces . . .the quality of the society into which it is born.3
At first blush, there seems to be a conflict between the right of privacy
which allegedly mandates against interference with a woman's decision to abort,
and the purported right of society to label as "a crime against humanity" the
insistence of a woman, in non-quality circumstances, to bear a child. If privacy
protects the decision to abort, why does it also not protect the decision to
reproduce?
The answer is simple: the right of privacy is limited. Compelling state
interests may justify intrusion upon it. Proponents of abortion-on-demand argue
that the fetus's right to live is not such a compelling state interest. This is not
145 Quoted in Ayd, supra note 144, at 17.
146 Statement submitted to the Governor's Commission Appointed To Review New State's
Abortion Law, quoted in MINORITY REPORT, supra note 87, at 74.
147 Merton, supra note 136, at 17.
148 Supra note 108.
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to say, however, that other -interests might not be considered paramount -
especially when they directly concern the smooth functioning of the quality
society.
One of these interests may be the control of population. As a plaintiff in
the New York abortion actions, Dr. Alan F. Guttmacher urged the primacy
of "the right to choose whether and when to bear and raise children. ' 14 9 On
the other hand, as population planner, Dr. Guttmacher wrote-
Still, the task of reducing birth rate, is a difficult one. There are deeply
rooted cultural and psychological obstacles to its accomplishment. The
basic- question remains: Can equilibrium, or even slowing of population
growth be achieved by .voluntary m4ans or -will coercive measures by
governmental ukdse be necessary? It is my belief that voluntary measures
should be .tried in the critical decade ahead. If the rate of population
growth has not been slowed to i3/2% or less by then,, coerc'we measures
may be necessary.150 (Emphasis added.)
Although Griswold v. Connecticut"0 1 assures to the marital partners the right
to use contraceptives, it may not assure to them the right not to use contraceptives.
With increasing frequency, one hears and reads polemics for compulsory
contraception.' Can compulsory abortion be far behilid? Professor Charles
E. Rice points out that if the fetus's right to live is subordinated to the right of
priiracy, and if the right of privacy, is in turn subordinated to society's plan to
achieve quality through compulsory contraception, then compulsory abortion,
as -a back-stop to compulsoi-y contraception, is a dear and present danger. 5
Dr. Kingsley Davis of the University of California favors compulsory abortion
for out-of-wedlock pregnancies 54 and Dr. Harold Francis of the United Liverpool
Hospital foresees compulsory .abortion as a means of population control.'55
It might be claimed that across-the-board compulsory birth control (by
contraception or abortion) is non-discriminatory and therefore unobjectionable.
But this is merely to say that a universal loss of a particular valued freedom
(by the general reordering of values -within the framework of ordered liberty)
is preferable to a discriminatory deprivation of freedom. This may well be so;
nevertheless, it is still a loss of an important human freedom. Further, whether
the compulsion will be non-discriminatory is much to be doubted. For instance,
schemes to withhold tax exemptions from the multi-child family obviously will
disadvantage the poor. Some' plans call for compulsory abortion and contra-
ception only for unwed mothers,'56 and substantial efforts are being made to
149 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 85.
150 Guttmacher, Planning the Family of Man, in 1970 MEDICAL WORLD NEws, OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 25 (1970).
151 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
152 See, e.g., Young, Alverson and Young, Court Ordered- Contraception, 55 A.B.AJ
223 (1969); Lamm, The Reproductive Revolution, 56 A.B.A.J. 41 (1970). A review and
analysis of the compulsory birth control movement -are contained in RICE, THE VANISHING
RIGHT TO LIVE 125-29 (1969).
153 - Rice, Abortion: Orwellian Considerations, Twin Circle, Nov. 23, 1969, at 3, col. 1.
154 Ayd, Liberal Abortion Laws, AMERICA, Feb. 1, 1969 at 130, 132.
155 The Tablet, May 28, 1970 at 7, col. 7.
156 See, e.g., text accompanying note 154 supra; Young, Alverson & Young, supra note 152.
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legitimatize coercive sterilization of women receiving Aid to Dependent Chil-
dren. 1
57
One of the problems with the quality of life jurisprudence and its norms
of "usefulness" and "dollars" is, as has been shown, its incompatibility with the
ideal of fundamental human equality.' Non-quality individuals are devalued
or excluded from the human species altogether depending on the quality-
prejudice of the moment.'59 An alternative to universal compulsory birth control
could very well be selective coercion of those non-quality individuals. In the
New York abortion actions, plaintiffs' witness, Dr. Natalie Shainess testified:
Q. Would you favor legislation which would define a minimum quality
of life of the female . . . in order for her to be permitted to have a child
in this state?
A. Let me answer that in this way. It is such a general question that it
is awfully hard to answer.
But if one could define - and I think it would take time to sit down
and think them out - certain conditions, then I would.1 0
Dr. Garret Hardin stated:
If the total circumstances are such that the child born at a particular
time and under particular circumstances will not receive a fair shake in
life, then she [the mother] should know - she should feel in her bones -
that she has no right to continue the pregnancy....
It may seem a rather coldhearted thing to say, but we should make
abortions available to keep down our taxes, but let us not hesitate to say
this if such a statement will move legislators to do what they should do
anyway.
61
If statutorily compelled abortions of non-quality individuals seem far-
fetched, one need only recall the blackest mark on American jurisprudence,
Buck v. Bell,' wherein the Supreme Court sanctioned the compulsory steriliza-
tion of mental defectives. Bearing in mind current "scientific" claims that
Negroes are genetically inferior,'63 one might anticipate an argument for com-
pulsory abortion of the disadvantaged similar to the following:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacri-
157 See RICa, supra note 152, at 141-42, 146 for a critique of these plans.
158 See text accompanying notes 126-46 supra.
159 Cf., e.g., O'Connor, On Humanity and Abortion, 13 NATURAL L.F. 127 (1968);
Knutson, When Does a Human Life Begin? Viewpoints of Public Health Professionals, 57
AM. J. oF PUBLIC HEALTH 2163 (1967). Since "[w]e are all partially disabled because
mental and physical perfection - like all other perfections - is only for diagrams," E.
CAHN, THE MORAL DEciSION 217 (1955), the quality decision is bound to reflect current
prejudice.
160 Deposition of Natalie Shainess, M.D., at 108-109.
161 Address delivered at the Second Annual California Conference On Abortion, May 11,
1969, quoted in N.Y. Times, May 12, 1969, at 66, col. 5. Not all proponents of compulsory birth
control favor selective coercion of the disadvantaged. See, e.g., Guttmacher, supra note 150.
162 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
163 See Edson, Jensenism, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, §6 (Magazine), at 10, col. 1.
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fices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our
being swamped with incompetence. 64
Fortunately, any attempt to legislate discriminatory coercive abortion
will encounter substantial judicial barriers. The Supreme Court, in striking
down a statute providing for the sterilization of a particular class of felons in
Skinner v. Oklahoma,65 did not expressly overrule Buck v. Bell but "the
Skinner decision did betoken an attitude of judicial hostility toward sterilization,
perhaps as an outgrowth of the use of it in Nazi Germany."' " Hopefully the
Court will manifest a similar hostile attitude toward compulsory abortion. In
Shapiro v. Thompson,6 the Court struck down a statute conditioning the
receipt of welfare payments on a one-year residency in the state. This burden
was considered so oppressive as to effectively deprive the poor of their right
of interstate travel. The right of the poor to reproduce is no less valuable.
Psychological coercion of the poor is probably a more immediate threat
than statutory compulsion. Such coercion has already been noted in the case
of contraception,"s and psychiatrist Harold Rosen, M.D., warns that "[w]ith
some the desire for an abortion is physician-induced."' Testifying in the
New York abortion actions, plaintiff Robert E. Hall, M.D., asserted, "Clinic
patients don't - almost never request abortions, it's very rare."' 7 Presumably the
poor will have to be educated as to the availability of abortion. The oppor-
tunities for subtle coercion are unlimited.
Coercion fits naturally into the quality of life jurisprudence, but freedom
and coercion cannot coexist. Nor can we risk the threat of coercion of the
disadvantaged who have yet to reap the full harvest of freedom.
D. Brutality versus Decency
The techniques of abortion, as recently described, are worth contemplating:
According to Dr. H. P. Dunn, a Fellow of both the Royal College of
Surgeons and the Royal College of Gynaecologists and Obstetricians,
164 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
165 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
166 Rica., supra note 152, at 143-44.
167 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
168 See Ayd, Birth Control and Public Policy: A Viewpoint, Medical-Moral Newsletter,
March, 1966, at 4.
169 Rosen, The Emotionally Sick Pregnant Patient: Psychiatric Indications and Contraindica-
tions to the Interruption of Pregnancy, in THERAPFuTic ABORTON 219, 220 (Rosen ed. 1954).
170 Deposition of Robert E. Hall, M.D., at 94. Contrary to charges that current abortion
laws discriminate against the poor, see United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035
(D.D.C. 1969), it may be that the poor have fewer abortions primarily because they do not
ask for them. It has also been noted that the poor typically come under a doctor's care at a
relatively late stage in pregnancy when an abortion may no longer be safe and when the
initial mental stress of pregnancy has abated, thus precluding a psychiatric abortion. Ste
MIoRoITY REPORT, supra note 87, at 80-81. In any event, one assumes that almost every
law is harder on the poor than the rich. That is what being poor is all about. Indeed, it
might be argued that criminal laws, especially, discriminate against the poor since social
conditions in the ghetto foster crime. This is hardly a reason for repealing our penal codes.
Finally, it has been held that laws are not unconstitutional because in their general applica-
tion they are harder on the poor than the rich. See Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293,
298 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (abortion statute); Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D.N.M.
1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969) (garnishment statute).
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one of the methods used is: "to dilate the entrance to the womb, then
insert a large forceps and drag out the baby and the afterbirth. This is
not as easy as it sounds. The surgeon must work by touch alone. He
gives a tug - a tiny arm comes away; then other fragments of the body.
The head is always difficult; the skull gets crushed; the eyeballs protrude.
All the time the bleeding is profuse. When the abortion has been com-
pleted," writes Dr. Dunn, "the problem of the disposal of the remains has
to be faced by the nursing staff. Incineration is the favored method. So
ends the life of another human being - thrown out with a mess of blood
clots and dirty swabs, unwanted, unremembered."
Another method of abortion described by Dr. Dunn is as follows:
"The woman has a general anaesthetic, an abdominal incision, the womb
is incised from top to bottom and the baby lifted out. It makes some Weak
movement of its arms and legs, and tries to breathe. Sometimes it manages
a pathetic cry like a kitten; then after a few minutes it dies an asphyxial
death and lies coldly in a stainless steel bowl."
The third method is the most "scientific." "A large needle," Dr.
Dunn tells us, "is inserted through the abdomen into the womb and a
strong solution of salt or glucose is injected. The baby can be felt to make
a few convulsive movements, and within a few minutes it dies. In about
twenty-four hours labor starts and the already disintegrating baby is de-
livered."171
Abortion is a brutal and violent procedure, which is fundamentally' re-
pugnant to the philosophy of medical practice. The New York Times quoted
an obstetrician, "You have to realize that obstetricians by training and practice
are geared to bringing new life into the world, not destroying it. For many of
us, religious objections notwithstanding, abortions simply go against our
grain."' 2 It has been reported that the massive abortion rate in Hiingary "is
resulting in increased depressive reactions and breakdowns among guilt-ridden
Hungarian physicians."' 78  In Oregon, obstetrical residents in state-supported
hospitals rebelled against the assembly line of abortions which they were called
on to perform under the state's new abortion law.1 4 Mrs. Jill Knight, a Member
of Parliament, reported that one London surgeon removes the fetus with the
amniotic sac intact so that nurses will not hear the cry or see the movement of
hands and feet. 5
It seems that many doctors who voted for relaxation of the law in one
poll or another are having second thoughts, with the result that a large number
of abortions are being performed in a relatively small number of institutios.
171 Matt, Murderous and Ghastly, Wanderer Reprint (1970) (reprinted from The
Wanderer, Feb. 26, 1970). A new technique "literally sucks up the unborn child and
macerates it beyond recognition." Pro, A California Doctor Speaks His Mind . . .and Heart,
Twin Circle, May 24, 1970, at 2, col. 1, 11, col. 1.
172 N.Y. Times, May 30, 1970, at 50, col. 8.
173 Ratner, A Public Health Physician Views Abortion, 7 CZmLD & FAMILY 38, 42.
174 DeMaria, New Laws, New Problems, in 1970 MEDICAL WORLD NEws, OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 36 (1970).
175 Diamond, supra note 57, at 38.
176 In California, 8 hospitals, with only 8 per cent of the live births in 1968, accounted
for 40 per cent of the abortions. Only 34 hospitals have performed as many as 100 abortions
over the two-year life of the California law. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 135 at 3.
Britain and Hawaii are having similar experiences. See SHAW, supra notC 135 at 7; N.Y.
Times, June 8, 1970, at 1, col. 2. A poll of British doctors revealed that two-thirds are now
in favor of a more restrictive law. SHAW, supra note 135, at 8.
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Doctors are now becoming fearful that as the demand increases they may be
coerced into the practice of abortion '
The cruelty of abortion-on-demand is not irrelevant to its legality. "Canons
of decency" are a part of the morality of justice."7 For instance, some of the
tests of a denial of fourteenth amendment due process are ". . . conduct that
shocks the conscience,""' ". . . methods too close to the rack and the screw to
permit of constitutional differentiation,"'80 and ". . . force so brutal and so
offensive to human digni.... In Rochin v. California," the Supreme
Court mandated the exclusion of evidence forcibly extracted from an accused
by a stomach pump. The Court said, "... to sanction the brutal conduct...
would be to afford brutality the cloak of law.""ls Curetting a child is no less
brutal than pumping a stomach.
Aboriion has another dimension vis-a-vis decency. Historically, the removal
of an individual from the law's protection was regarded as punishment for a
crime. For instance, in the early common law, a person accused of a felony,
in his status as fugitive, might be outlawed, "put outside the king's peace and
protection," and the outlaw could then be killed with impunity.8 Abortion-
on-demand is the equivalent of outlawing the unborn child. He is punished,
in his status as unborn, by being removed from the law's "peace' and pro-
tection."
In Robinson v. California,5 the Supreme Court held that punishment
for a status was cruel and unusual within the prohibition of the eighth amend-
ment to the Constitution. If punishment of an addict, qua addict, is cruel
and unusual, then so too is punishment of the unborn, qua unborn."6 It is no
excuse for the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment upon the unborn
child that he is unwanted by his parents or society or that he may be burden-
some to both. Persons may not be punished ". . . whose only crime . . . and
whose main offense usually consists in . . disturbing by their presence the
sensibilities [of others]."'87
It has been said that "[tihe Eighth Amendment expresses the revulsion of
civilized man against barbarous acts - the 'cry of horror' against man's in-
177 See Pro, supra note 171 (recounting complaints to medical boards and threats of
law suits against California doctors who refused to perform abortions). The pressure may also
be exerted by the press. For instance, the New York Times characterized the reluctance of
doctors to get involved in "the messy business of abortion" as "foot-dragging medical con-
servatism." N.Y. Times, June 8, 1970, at 29, col. 1.
178 Rochin v. Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
179 Id. at 172.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 174.
182 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
183 Id. at 173.
184 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLxs H LAW. 604-605 (5th ed. 1942).
185 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
186 In the New York abortion actions, plaintiffs argued that anti-abortion statutes impose
cruel and unusual punishment upon the pregnant woman. Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 7,
at 132-35. Such statutes do not punish the status of being pregnant; they punish the voluntary
act of abortion. "The point of the Robinson case is that there was no overt act committed.
The Supreme Court condemned a criminal conviction for status only." Rubin, Constitutional
Aspects of the Model Sentencing Act, 42 F.R.D. 226, 228 (1968).
187 Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 315, 229 N.E.2d 426, 430, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 744(1967).
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humanity to his fellow man."'" Abortion-on-demand seems to be just such a
barbarous practice. It is essentially incompatible with the ethical-legal ideal
of decency.
The value system of abortion-on-demand is opposed to those first moral
principles which underlie our law: the sanctity of life, fundamental human
equality, freedom, and decency.
III. Whose Morality?
Law and morality interact with each other. Morality is a source of law
but ". . morality and law stand in a reciprocal relation. Moral attitudes and
standards may themselves be a product of law."' '89
A. The Consensus as Shaper of the Law
If morality is a source of law, then law must bear some relationship to the
moral consensus. The moral consensus, in turn, must be distinguished from
majority opinion and current trends in thought on a particular issue. The
consensus is not majoritarianism; rather, it consists of the profound first prin-
ciples which a society holds to be true, indeed, self-evident. 9 In America, these
are the sanctity of life, fundamental human equality, decency and freedom.
Examples of the primacy of consensus over majoritarianism are not wanting.
For instance, we do not measure a Negro's right to equal treatment by current
prejudices. Here, neither popular vote", nor public opinion poll 9 is a relevant
reference point. The maelstrom of public opinion is not the mainstream of
Constitutional morality. Instead, the Negro's rights are determined by reference
to the first principle of fundamental human equality regardless of current popular
opinion on the issue involved. "The sovereignty of the people is itself subject
to those constitutional limitations which have been duly adopted and remain
unrepealed."''
Popular polls cannot, therefore, decide the ethical-legal validity of abor-
tion-on-demand. The issue of the human rights of a human-in-being, whether
he be adult Negro or Caucasian fetus, must be resolved in the context of relevant
Constitutional-moral principles, and abortion-on-demand does not, as has been
shown, measure up to these first principles.' 94
It should be emphasized here that popular polls on abortion are all but
useless as indicators of even a majority opinion. Typically such polls ask "Would
you favor relaxation of abortion laws to legalize abortion in the case of
?" An affirmative response may well mean that although the respondent
is morally opposed to abortion as a violation of the sanctity of life, he does
188 Robinson v. Cal., 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
189 FREUND supra note 91, at 42.
190 See Murray, Natural Law and the Public Consensus, in NATURAL LAW AND MODERN
SociETY 48, 48-49 (1962).
191 See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967).
192 See Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Il. 1969).
193 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969).
194 See text accompanying notes 93-188 supra.
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not wish "to, impose his morality on others." A more meaningful poll would
ask the question: "Do you consider that legalization of aboration in the case
of is consistent with the principle of the sanctity of life?"
The question would be preceded by an explanation of the facts of life before
birth.
In New York, it is extremely doubtful that a majority favor abortion-on-
demand. The new law was opposed by the New York State Medical Society,"'5
and by influential religious leaders who had previously favored a limited modifica-
tion of existing law.'9 6 Some legislators expressed their personal opposition to
abortion-on-demand, but voted for the bill on the theory that abortion is a
matter of personal choice. 97 Finally, a poll taken in December of 1967 re-
vealed that less than eleven percent of the people polled favored legalized abortion
where the motive for the abortion is the unwantedness of the child. "
Some commentators defend legalization of abortion-on-demand because
they believe that society no longer considers abortion immoral. Sociologist
Reverend Joseph P. Fitzpatrick expressed his personal abhorrence of abortion but
implied that the action of the New York legislature was defensible because
"If a majority of citizens no longer accepts a moral code, is it wise policy to
attempt to enforce the moral code by law?," and "The decision of the New
York State Legislature indicates that the consensus of opinion necessary to
support a law is no longer present in the case of abortion legislation."' 99 Father
Fitzpatrick obviously mistakes majoritarianism for consensus, and, further, he
assumes that a majority actually favored the abortion-on-demand bill. Implicit
in his statement, too, is the idea that legislators are free to vote on questions
involving fundamental constitutional morality according to the will of a majority
of their constituents. However, in a case involving segregated housing, it was
held that even if the legislators were correct in their uniform assessment of
public opinion, "... . they cannot acquiesce in the sentiment of their constituents
to keep their neighborhoods White and to deny admission to Negroes via the
placement of public housing."2 9 Fundamental human equality overrides public
opinion. Unfortunately, Father Fitzpatrick's conception of consensus and the
obligation of legislators could justify legalized racial oppression as easily as it
justifies legalized abortion-on-demand.
Jurisprudent Patrick Devlin takes a position similar to that of Father
Fitzpatrick, seeming to indicate, albeit ambiguously, that anti-abortion laws
ought to be repealed because society no longer appreciates the "sinfulness" of
abortion.20 ' What was said about Father Fitzpatrick's approach to abortion
applies equally to that of Lord Devlin." 2 In addition, there is a certain in-
195 See N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1970, at 82, col. 2.
196 Knickerbocker News (Albany), Mar. 23, 1970, at 12A, cols. 1-6.
197 See, e.g., id., Feb. 10, 1970, at 2B, cols. 2-7 (quoting Assemblywoman Mary Ann
Krupsak).
198 OLIVER QUAYLE & Co., A SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION ON ABORTION IN NEW YORK
17 (1968).
199 N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1970, §1, at 48, col. 3.
200 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. I1. 1969).
201 P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALs 23-24 (1965).
202 See Gianella, The Difficult Quest for a Truly Humane Abortion Law, 13 VILL. L. REV.
257, 268 (1968):
If a community evidences a growing inclination to ignore the most basic rights of
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consistency in Lord Devlin's ideas. Elsewhere, he seems to consider morality
in law as a sort of seamless web, no part of which can be tampered with without
destroying the whole and society with it.' If this be so, then anti-abortion
laws should remain undisturbed because proponents of abortion-on-demand
advance their proposals in the context of the new morality of quality of life.
As so viewed, legalized abortion-on-demand should signify to Lord Devlin not
only a vast increase in total abortions'"4 (because of a further and accelerated
moral devaluation of unborn human life), but also a predictable change in
attitude toward infanticide and euthanasia. The web is in danger of being
torn apart.
Devlin's adversary in an extended jurisprudential debate, utilitarian H. L. A.
Hart, also favors relaxation of abortion laws' but this may be because he
misunderstands the nature of the issues. The only objection he sees to abortion
is that it will promote promiscuity and he finds that sexual immorality is rife
anyway; hence liberty should prevail.' Elsewhere, Hart has agreed that
since all social moralities, whatever else they may contain, make pro-
vision in some degree for such universal values as individual freedom,
safety of life, and protection from deliberately inflicted harm, there will
always be much in social morality which is worth preserving even at the
cost in terms of these same values which legal enforcement involves.20 7
Perhaps if Hart had considered abortion in terms of these universal values,
instead of as a problem in sexual morality, he might have reached a different
conclusion."M
For the time being at least, the sanctity of life, fundamental human equality,
freedom and decency remain as the American ethical-legal consensus. Abortion-
on-demand and the quality of life jurisprudence are the antitheses of that
consensus. (Indeed, it is difficult to see how there could have been an abortion
movement without a quality of life jurisprudence.)
B. The Consensus as Shaped by Law
If abortion-on-demand is widely legalized, can the consensus survive?
The interaction of law and morals, as has been noted, is reciprocal. 9
Law shapes morality, especially when it touches the constitutional-moral prin-
ciples which are the American consensus. Professor Paul Freund observed,
"When claims are raised in lawsuits that invoke these ethical-legal standards, the
a helpless minority, one should not regard the repeal of criminal laws enforcing
those rights as the appropriate response of the leaders of society. Instead they
should seek to instill or revive an appreciation of and respect for the rights pro-
tected by law.
203 DEVLIN, supra note 201, at 114-15.
204 See note 135 supra.
205 H. L. A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 46-48 (1965).
206 Id. at 48.
207 H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 70 (paperback ed. 1966).
208 See B. MITCHELL, LAW, MORALITY, AND RELIGION IN A SECULAR SOCIETY (1967)
for an analysis of the Hart-Devlin debate, and see particularly id. at 80-81 for a critique of
the position of each on abortion.
209 See text accompanying note 189 supra.
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opinions of fhe 'Court are bound to contribute to our more general thinking
about social justice and ethical conduct." ' Suggestions that legalization of
abortion will merely put the law in a position of neutrality with respect to
fetal life,211 or that the law should be repealed because it is unenforceable," 2
or that anti-abortion laws encourage the criminal abortionist to cater, at high
prices, to an inelastic demand for abortion,1 2 fail to take into account not only
the phenomenon of the law as teacher, but also the jurisprudence of the pro-
abortionists. As already shown, legalized abortion results in an enormous in-
crease in total abortions,214 and the jurisprudence of abortion-on-demand en-
compasses infanticide, euthanasia and perhaps, discriminatory coercive abortion.
It has been argued that feticide on the one hand, and infanticide and
euthanasia on the other, are fundamentally different and that experience in
other countries fails to bear out the dire predictions of an erosion of respect for
life.212 The argument fails for several reasons: First, the underlying luality of
life jurisprudence of the abortion movement has surfaced only recently. It
is not a haphazard, ad hoc philosophy. Theoreticians have expounded it com-
prehensively and cohesively."'8 Second, the techno-morality of this jurispru-
dence has been abetted by the recent explosion of new techniques for the control
and manipulation of life.21 ' In techno-moralism, know-how often determines
210 FREUND, supra note 91, at 35; see L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF
135-38 (paperback ed. 1966).
211 Address by Father Robert Drinan, International Conference on Abortion, Sept, 6,
1967 (quoted in Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 143). The concept of State Action under
the Fourteenth Amendment severely circumscribes alleged government neutrality in the area
of basic human rights. Proponents of abortion-on-demand seek to place the unborn child
beyond the law's protection specifically for the purpose of vesting in private persons the option
to kill the child with impunity. Experience has shown that where abortion laws are relaxed,
the total number of abortions rises dramatically. See supra note 135 and infra note 214.
Given (a) the known purpose of the proponents of change, (b) the anticipated impact of
relaxation of the law on the lives of thousands of unborn children, and (c) the protection
which anti-abortion laws presently afford to the unborn human child, the result of repealing
such laws is an affirmative governmental involvement in the private decision to kill. See
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), wherein the Supreme Court determined that
repeal of a fair housing provision affirmatively involved the state in racial discrimination.
The Court said:
Here the California court, armed' as it was with the knowledge of the facts and
circumstances concerning the passage and potential impact of § 26, and familiar
with the milieu in which that provision would operate, has determined that the pro-
vision would involve the State in private racial discriminations to an unconstitu-
tional degree. We accept this holding of the California court. Id. 'at 378-79.
Repeal of anti-abortion laws constitutes, not governmental neutrality, but governmental
involvement.
212 E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 38-40 (1965). In this respect some have com-
pared anti-abortion laws to Prohibition; however, there are fundamental distinctions be-
tween the two. First, drinking or the abstention therefrom is hardly in close proximity to the
first principles of Constitutional morality. Second, as Professor Pai Freund points out, it
ultimately appeared that Prohibitionists opposed drinking not so much for the pain it caused
to society or to the drinker, but for the pleasure which the drinker derived from it. FREUND,
supra note 91, at 42. No such remoteness of morality or confusion of motives exists with
respect to abortion.
213 H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 342-44 (1968).
214 Supra note 135. It has been estimated that in New York City alone abortions under
the new New York statute may reach 50,000 a year. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1970,-at 29, col. 6.
215 Gianella, supra note 202, at 274-75.
216 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 105; J. FLETCHER, MOILS AND MEDICINE (1954);
J. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS (1966).




morality and we are invited to "play God" with human life2 18 Third, the
breaking of the genetic code219 and the development of the new medical specialty
of fetology, which concentrates on the fetus as a human patient,220 are changing
the human-ness of the fetus from an intellectual, noumenal abstract to a popular,
phenomenal reality. We can no longer avoid the realization that abortion kills
a human-in-being. Fourth, growing pressures for population and pollution con-
trol and for the reduction of welfare lists provide a fertile field for the cultiva-
tion of the quality of life jurisprudence as public policy.
Taking account of this milieu, one political scientist ruefully concluded,
"I do not see how a society committed to this value system can stop short of
legalizing infanticide."22 ' He even predicted the argument that will be made:
Existentially, this child is and will always be incapable of anything that
we can recognize as a personal act. He is not a person by any test that
we can regard as valid. Instead, he is one of nature's mistakes, a mass
of badly organized matter that should have attained personality but did
not.2
2
Euthanasia and infanticide raise the spectre of Nazi Germany. Too often,
one thinks of the Nazi experience as an insane aberration rather than as a
natural and proximate consequence of the quality of life jurisprudence. Dr.
Frederic Wertham found the origin of the Hitler-era disrespect for life in
"tendencies in psychiatry (and not only in German psychiatry) to pronounce
value judgments not only on individuals, on medical grounds, but on whole
groups, on medicosociological grounds." 3 He continued:
Most influential was the book The Release of the Destruction of Life
Devoid of Value, published in Leipzig in 1920. Its popularity is attested
by the fact that two years later a second edition became necessary. The
book advocated that the killing of "worthless people" be released from
penalty and legally permitted. It was written by two prominent scientists,
the jurist Karl Binding and the psychiatrist Alfred Hoche. The concept
of "life devoid of value" or "life not worth living" was not a Nazi inven-
tion, as is often thought. It derives from this book.2 24
What the life devoid of value is to euthanasia, the quality of life is to abortion.
The medicosociology is identical in each case.
The danger of the quality of life jurisprudence is in the cultural climate which
it creates and fosters. In that climate, genuine humanitarians may well become
indifferent executioners without even realizing it. Several years ago, three doctors
were tried in Germany for their part in Hitler's euthanasia program for mental
defectives. They claimed in defense that as young, inexperienced doctors,
218 E.g., AuGENSTEIN, COME LET Us PLAY GOD (1969); see SULLIVAN, Wider Detection of
Prenatal Flaws Expected to Spur Abortions, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1970, at 11, col. 1.
219 See WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX (1968).
220 See Medicine's Newest Patient: The Fetus, RociE MEDICAL IMAGE, Feb., 1968, at
6, 10.
221 Canavan, History Repeats Itself, AMRmCA, May 21, 1966, at 738, 739.
222 Id. at 742.
223 WERTHAM, supra note 123, at 160.
224 Id. at 161.
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they had been "seduced idealists" who felt no sense of personal guilt for their
conduct since they were assured at the time that they were acting for the good
of mankind." The seduced idealism did not stop at euthanasia of mental
defectives. Hannah Arendt maintains that the final solution of the Jewish
problem, implemented as it was by the sophisticated science of gas chambers
rather than the crude violence of firing squads, was closely connected with
Hitler's euthanasia program for the mentally ill." 6
Devaluing even the most "useless," non-quality human life, even for the
most "humanitarian" of reasons is a dangerous undertaking.
Abortion-on-demand directly attacks the ethical-legal principles of the
American consensus. If abortion-on-dtmand is widely legalized, it is doubtful
that the consensus will survive. Justice Brandeis' warning in a famous dissent
is apposite here: "Our Government is the potent, the omni-present teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is con-
tagious."' 27
C. The Future of the Consensus
There are some observers who claim that the moral consensus has already
broken down. 8 Indeed, America may have entered a situation of anomie,
that social climate characterized by a confusion of goals produced by a break-
down in the consensus." 9 The individual simply does not know what is right
and what is wrong. 30  In the morning, he vigorously proclaims the ethical-
legal principle of the sanctity of life in a protest against war; in the afternoon,
he subverts that principle in a protest against anti-abortion laws. One is told
of the dawning of a new age of social awareness; yet the destruction of an
unwanted child in utero is the ultimate renunciation of social responsibility.
The alienation of parent from child in Eastern Europe2 .. and Japan23 2 has been
attributed to a youthful cynicism toward traditional intra-family relationships,
generated by the prevalence of abortion-on-demand. Despite these precedents,
America searches elsewhere for the causes of her "generation gap."
The American people appear to be at a crossroads. Either the American
consensus survives or it is undermined by the quality of life jurisprudence.
There are hopeful signs both in the growing awareness that legal restraints are
necessary to protect the integrity of human-ness from a rampant techno-
225 N.Y. Times, May 24, 1967, at 11, col. 1.
226 H. ARENDT, EIcHMAN IN JERUSALEM 106 (rev. ed. 1965); see RICE, supra note 152,
at 61-66. Rice argues that
euthanasia is the logical end of the current agitation for abortion. More precisely,
a coherent defense against euthanasia requires a strong offensive against abortion.
Both of these subordinate the right to live to the lesser needs of others or to the
social design of the state. Id. at 66.
227 Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
228 See A. HAcKER, THE END OF THE AMERicAN ERA (1970); M. EVANS & M. MooE,
THE LAWBREACERS (1968); and Cogley, supra note 1, for a diversity of viewpoints on the
breakdown in the consensus.
229 See E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 103 (7th ed. 1966).
230 Id.
231 See Harrison, On the Futility of Legalizing Abortion, 95 CAN. MED. Assoc. J. 360,
362 (1966).
232 R. SHAW, ABORTION ON TRIAL 131 (1968).
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morality,23' and in the rebellion of doctors against the horrors of assembly line
abortions. But perhaps it is merely a matter of time before doctors, along with
lawyers, become the "seduced idealists" of Nazi Germany.
At this critical time, an explicit answer is needed to the question of whose
morality is being incorporated into law when anti-abortion laws are repealed
by legislatures or overturned by courts. The author has attempted to supply
the answer. Recently Harriet Pilpel, a lawyer and long-time crusader for
repeal of anti-abortion laws, wrote:
As our laws in the United States are repealed or liberalized or de-
dared unconstitutional, it becomes clear that only half the battle is won
and that public and professional attitudes and the will (or lack of will)
to implement the freedom conferred are also crucial.23
Repeal of the law, in Mrs. Pilpel's view, must be followed by a change in
"attitude" and "will." Could it be that the quality of life jurisprudents
are imposing their morality on all Americans and Americans don't even know it?
233 E.g., HUMAN RIGHTS AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT,. supra
note 20.
234 Pilpel, Book Review, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1970, § 7 (Book Review), at 6, col. 1.(Mrs. Pilpel is counsel to Planned Parenthood World Population and the Association for
the Study of Abortion.)
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